i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Compatibilism wouldn't work with Plantinga's defence because compatibilism is intrinsically determinist. Compatibilism doesn't challenge the determinist position that every action is causally determined by the conditions at the universe's origin state (i.e. anything that happens was always going to happen and probability is in the mind). Rather, compatibilists contest the claim that freedom need entail the metaphysical property of making decisions independent of one's causally determined being. For instance, if in the context of a trial i were to say 'The accused acted of her own free will,' i am not making a metaphysical claim about the nature of the universe. i am saying that the accused acted according to her own motivations, that is, not under coercion or duress. According to compatibilists, those motivations will be themselves by the product of the accused's reason, her sense experiences, and possibly also her innate or instinctive characteristics, all of which are ultimately material in origin, but they are her motivations nevertheless; so long as nobody if forcing her to do something she doesn't intend she is acting of her own free will. Within a compatibilist framework, this is the only possible kind of freedom, since human beings have their origins within a determinist reality, in which the ability to do good is identical to the state of being predetermined to do good. It's a worldview that is fundamentally incompatible, no pun intended, with the basic premises of Plantinga's argument.
Erm...You did humor the idea that I already knew and understood the concept of compatibilism, right?. :P
This wasn't really what I was getting at anyhow, since I think this definition of compatibilism is basically just determinism with a definition of free will that doesn't require "freewill" to mean "the will of a free thinking agent".
What I was thinking was a form of compatibilism where events unfold in a deterministic fashion, but people are still potentially morally responsible for their actions, a la Frankfurt cases , though I think the example here is kind of dumb, it adds a detail that I think makes the example more muddled rather than clearer, what I think a cleaned up version would look like:
Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats.Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Donald votes Democratic of his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic although, owing to Ms. White's device, he lacks freedom to do otherwise.
Just view "Ms. White" as God for the purposes of our discussion. I suppose it could be argued that this view could work as a counter argument to Plantinga's Defense, I.E. God could create a world where no evil actually takes place, but people would have performed evil acts if he hadn't micromanaged people into not doing it, but then this gets into a semantic debate of "is that sufficiently free?", and also "can humans really be held accountable for their prevented morally wrong decisions in a world where those decisions have never every taken place and humans wouldn't necessarily understand the concept of morally wrong", and then other issues like it being just to punish someone for action they would have done if left to their own device.
I guess what I'm saying is that despite different ways to view compatibilism, I see Plantinga's point that counter arguments of this sort are sort of paradoxical. At least, I feel they'd need to address so many issues (As is often the case in hypothetical alternative world scenarios) that it's hard to walk away feeling they've really proven any sort of point.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Well, firstly, that Plantinga's argument posits that every person has an independent soul which contributes a 'world segment' to creation, in effect elevating each human individual to the status of co-first-cause (since while Plantinga's God created human beings, He enabled them to make their own decisions and thereby contribute to the process of creation). This runs counter to the findings of modern neuroscience, which strongly suggest that thought is the result of physical processes in the material brain (Crick's 'astonishing hypothesis' - 'You're nothing but a pack of neurons!').
The neuroscientific, physicalist position is also more attractive to me because it more closely reflects my perceptions of my own decision-making process. When i make a decision, i consider what course of action seems most conducive to achieving some particular aim, based on my own experiences of material reality. i'm also likely influenced by how i'm feeling at the time, which is a product of my material drives, hormones, etc. In two identical situations, where i am presented with the same choice, have the same knowledge and am in the same mood, i would always make the same decision; i can't see how anything else could be the case without removing some of my agency (e.g. as a result of quantum indeterminacy or demonic possession, say). i certainly can't see how i would gain freedom from the ability to make a decision that contradicts my own motivations.
I can see what you mean about this turning into the 2011 discussion.
I don't think "the ability to pick completely different choices if presented with identical situations" is really the definition of a free agent in this case, however. You're assuming that "you" in this case is your "pack of neurons" influenced by your past experiences and anything that influences you outside of that is basically is "not you". After rereading Plantinga's Transworld depravity section, I think he's going for a more combined view.
Kinda, the "You do not have a soul. You are a soul. You have a body" way of looking at things, though I don't see why it would be necessary to create yet another split with "neurons and experiences" being on the loosing end.
And, I mean the "collection of neurons" is sort of the position of "whatever science has discovered is the most likely scenario" doesn't really hold well in logic and (I hope I'm not coming off as offensive here) has been shown to be not a great way to conduct reasoning even in regards to scientific study, let alone philosophical discussion.
Secondly, Plantinga makes no attempt to address the question of why God, having created a universe in which human beings may freely choose to commit atrocities, doesn't at the very least then intervene to prevent the resulting suffering. The fact that great evils such as the Holocaust are permitted to happen in a universe ostensibly ruled by an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God is difficult for me to accept.
The concept doesn't really need to address specific atrocities, even the one usually considered to be the "greatest human inflicted atrocity in known history". The free will defense basically covers any human inflicted evil so that, in this case, this is sort of humans fault or at least some humans fault and not Gods fault for not preventing it. Unless we're journeying into Argument from Free Will territory, which is problematic in itself as I'm not sure it's possible to even put forth the premise without committing a modal fallacy.
And, going back to the "flip-side of murder" discussion, always kind of wonder in alternative world where their was no Holocaust, would we simply have the same argument but replace Holocaust with some atrocity Stalin did. That is, removing the holocaust doesn't make the existence of God more or less plausible, humans just pick whatever the most heinous thing was that happened in the world and argue about that.
Also, this sort of highlights at something I hinted at. When we dig deeper into the problem of evil and dredge up examples, it becomes more apparent that it relies on the emotional impact of what "evil" is get any sort of response. Hence my mention of the "appeal to emotion" fallacy above.
All that being said. You presented your position as "difficult for you to accept" which is fine, I'm not going to try to fight your persona l feelings by throwing logical concepts at them until they magically change into something else. You and I both know that's simply not going to happen.
I guess what I'm saying in a nutshell is my problem with the "Problem of Evil" (and this isn't directed at anyone here) is that once one really starts to look at it, it's apparent that it's an attempt at a calculated appeal to human ways of looking at things rather than anything that really stands in formal logic, and that no amount dubious applications of "Occam's Razor" or logic notation will elevate it "unassailable logic proof".
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
You get where i'm coming from, though, right? Maybe i'm being presumptuous, since i imagine Plantinga understands the concept better than i do, but, well, what exactly is the paradox in the compatibilist argument? As far as i can see there is no paradox, and they're simply operating under an entirely different definition of 'free will', one which can't be reconciled with Plantinga's understanding of the concept.
The paradox is that what's basically being suggested is "What if God created a world where we where free to defy his plan, except that God made sure we weren't able to defy is plan".
"It is a matter of grave importance that Fairy tales should be respected.... Whosoever alters them to suit his own opinions, whatever they are, is guilty, to our thinking, of an act of presumption, and appropriates to himself what does not belong to him." -- Charles Dickens
For the atheist, yes, precisely that; an atheistic cosmos need not be just or kind. It's not a nice prospect, but it doesn't pose any logical difficulties.
It does pose the paradox of atheists imposing the imaginary concepts of justice and kindness on themselves, though.
As to God not being both all-powerful and the Good if he doesn't intervene to prevent evil wills from having painful effects on others, that sounds like the Orthodox interpretation of Hell, where God welcomes everyone into his presence and the wicked experience his goodness as burning and inability to affect others. I can see a utilitarian argument that letting depraved beings hurt each other and hope they come to their senses does more good than quarantining them from other beings.
I suppose it could be argued that this view could work as a counter argument to Plantinga's Defense, I.E. God could create a world where no evil actually takes place, but people would have performed evil acts if he hadn't micromanaged people into not doing it, but then this gets into a semantic debate of "is that sufficiently free?", and also "can humans really be held accountable for their prevented morally wrong decisions in a world where those decisions have never every taken place and humans wouldn't necessarily understand the concept of morally wrong", and then other issues like it being just to punish someone for action they would have done if left to their own device.
You seem to be suggesting here that the difference between the compatibilist and libertarian definitions of 'free' is merely a question of degree, whereas i understood it to be a more fundamental distinction. It was my understanding that for a compatibilist, freedom to act according to ones own motivations, unimpeded, is the greatest possible freedom, and the metaphysical definition is simply abandoned. i don't think it's fair to characterize this position as paradoxical. It's simply incompatible with Plantinga's argument.
With that said, i'm also not sure how relevant any of this is when Plantinga presented his argument as simply articulating a possible case, and doing so within a libertarian framework. Compatibilist disagreement is to be expected, but doesn't affect his argument any.
I can see what you mean about this turning into the 2011 discussion.
>_<
Before i proceed i think i should clarify that i simply listed and outlined the parts of Plantinga's argument that i find difficult to believe, as i was asked to. i am not attempting formally to disprove them outright, which is certainly beyond me, if it can be done at all.
I don't think "the ability to pick completely different choices if presented with identical situations" is really the definition of a free agent in this case, however. You're assuming that "you" in this case is your "pack of neurons" influenced by your past experiences and anything that influences you outside of that is basically is "not you". After rereading Plantinga's Transworld depravity section, I think he's going for a more combined view.
Kinda, the "You do not have a soul. You are a soul. You have a body" way of looking at things, though I don't see why it would be necessary to create yet another split with "neurons and experiences" being on the loosing end.
i don't see that the identification of the human being with an incorporeal soul or dualistic being solves my problem, which is that, the way i see it, human actions have a clear cause (in terms of their motivations, not the physical brain matter) and therefore cannot be identified with Plantinga's free moral agents. Crick's position appears to support my view, but my view is not contingent on it.
And, I mean the "collection of neurons" is sort of the position of "whatever science has discovered is the most likely scenario" doesn't really hold well in logic and (I hope I'm not coming off as offensive here) has been shown to be not a great way to conduct reasoning even in regards to scientific study, let alone philosophical discussion.
Well, bearing in mind that i'm not myself a psychologist, psychologists are the foremost experts on the human mind, having studied it in considerable detail. The association of thought with electrochemical activity in the brain and the linking of specific mental processes with specific parts of the brain are both supported by an enormous amount of scientific research. As a layperson from a scientific standpoint, am i wrong to accept these claims?
i think my position here is comparable to how i would address Young Earth Creationist arguments, incidentally. i don't believe the YEC position has been logically disproven, but the observed evidence is overwhelmingly against it.
The concept doesn't really need to address specific atrocities, even the one usually considered to be the "greatest human inflicted atrocity in known history".
No, it doesn't, and as you say, the free will defence demonstrates that such actions are not necessarily caused by God, and i wasn't suggesting that they were.
The Holocaust was just an example; you could substitute Stalin's purges, Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward, the French Reign of Terror, or anything unambiguously meeting an objective definition of evil. All i'm saying is that there are some evils so foul that i find it impossible to understand God's allowing them to take place. There's clearly no reason why i must understand God's every action and inaction and i'm not presumptuous enough to expect to do so, but i find this particular detail disturbing and difficult to reconcile with my understanding of love.
I guess what I'm saying in a nutshell is my problem with the "Problem of Evil" (and this isn't directed at anyone here) is that once one really starts to look at it, it's apparent that it's an attempt at a calculated appeal to human ways of looking at things rather than anything that really stands in formal logic, and that no amount dubious applications of "Occam's Razor" or logic notation will elevate it "unassailable logic proof".
Well, you're much better versed in this stuff than i am. Is it possible to discuss the concepts of good and evil without introducting an appeal to emotion, by this reasoning?
It does pose the paradox of atheists imposing the imaginary concepts of justice and kindness on themselves, though.
This is an extraordinary claim, and i'd very much like to see your reasoning in support of it. i don't see that the atheist application of what are, for atheists, subjective values is in any way paradoxical.
I can see a utilitarian argument that letting depraved beings hurt each other and hope they come to their senses does more good than quarantining them from other beings.
A perfectly reasonable answer, but still not one that i find satisfying, personally.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
You seem to be suggesting here that the difference between the compatibilist and libertarian definitions of 'free' is merely a question of degree, whereas i understood it to be a more fundamental distinction. It was my understanding that for a compatibilist, freedom to act according to ones own motivations, unimpeded, is the greatest possible freedom, and the metaphysical definition is simply abandoned. i don't think it's fair to characterize this position as paradoxical. It's simply incompatible with Plantinga's argument.
With that said, i'm also not sure how relevant any of this is when Plantinga presented his argument as simply articulating a possible case, and doing so within a libertarian framework. Compatibilist disagreement is to be expected, but doesn't affect his argument any.
Well, he wasn't suggesting compatibilism was paradoxical, just that the compatabilist counter argument he was presented with was paradoxical. I wouldn't necessarily say any version of compatibilism is paradoxical. Just that it may operate under different definitions than other world views.
There probably is a version of the free will defense that would work with compatibilism as well, I just don't think there's a version that would offer a satisfactory counter-argument. Which is what I was mostly getting at.
i don't see that the identification of the human being with an incorporeal soul or dualistic being solves my problem, which is that, the way i see it, human actions have a clear cause (in terms of their motivations, not the physical brain matter) and therefore cannot be identified with Plantinga's free moral agents. Crick's position appears to support my view, but my view is not contingent on it.
Then, I'm not sure then if there's a conflict here, then. I'm not sure if Plantinga's argument is necessarily contingent on the idea that free well have a metaphysical component (though, I think he may be implying he thinks there is) insomuch that people buy into the idea that God creating humans with the ability do defy his will was sort of a "net benefit" for everyone.
I am interested in Crick's position, I just haven't had time to finish reading the article. <.<
Well, bearing in mind that i'm not myself a psychologist, psychologists are the foremost experts on the human mind, having studied it in considerable detail. The association of thought with electrochemical activity in the brain and the linking of specific mental processes with specific parts of the brain are both supported by an enormous amount of scientific research. As a layperson from a scientific standpoint, am i wrong to accept these claims?
i think my position here is comparable to how i would address Young Earth Creationist arguments, incidentally. i don't believe the YEC position has been logically disproven, but the observed evidence is overwhelmingly against it.
I wouldn't think the two examples are that comparable. I mean, scientific evidence showing that the world is a certain age vs the argument that it's an elaborate ruse by God or Satan isn't exactly the same as scientific evidence showing our brains react certain ways to certain situations and suggesting that there might be something else influencing our brain then the sum total of events that have built the biological mass in our heads.
Basically, YEC requires dismissing scientific discovers for whatever reason. Believing in a metaphysical or even physical aspect of will that goes beyond determinism isn't really something that requires one dismiss scientific data.
The Holocaust was just an example; you could substitute Stalin's purges, Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward, the French Reign of Terror, or anything unambiguously meeting an objective definition of evil. All i'm saying is that there are some evils so foul that i find it impossible to understand God's allowing them to take place. There's clearly no reason why i must understand God's every action and inaction and i'm not presumptuous enough to expect to do so, but i find this particular detail disturbing and difficult to reconcile with my understanding of love.
I guess the difference here is I don't really find it impossible, and the specific example wasn't really here nor there. But, I've understood "love" or "benevolence" in this case to include letting someone grow or develop on their own. Which probably gets a bit more complicated then say even the human forms of love and benevolence from rulers when one has to deal with the entire human race and possibly much more.
But we're probably just operating of rather different definitions here.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Well, you're much better versed in this stuff than i am. Is it possible to discuss the concepts of good and evil without introducting an appeal to emotion, by this reasoning?
Hmmm... Yes and no...
I mean, you could probably make the argument that there are concepts of evil that are pretty universally agreed to be "bad", but then you just sort of obscured the appeal to emotion with an argument ad populum.
Now, I'm not saying the topic isn't worth discussion. Obviously, if I thought it wasn't, I would have left or burned down this thread the second my silly thread about the Problem of Evil in a world with Magic Girls and things that ignore the laws of thermodynamics turned serious. Just that, the whole debate sort of turns into a discussion over conflicting view points where uber-formal logic really has no place, but if often doesn't get treated as such.
And maybe, just maybe I'm a little jaded in that I've read probably a books worth about this topic only to reflect on what I've read and had the epiphany of
So many of this stems not from what's been posted here, but the ridiculous amount of effort some people have put into to dress what is essentially an exercise in human judgement as some sort proven logical theorem (Again, this isn't directed at anyone here...you're all probably smart enough to realize that but I just want to cover my back here. :P)
There probably is a version of the free will defense that would work with compatibilism as well, I just don't think there's a version that would offer a satisfactory counter-argument. Which is what I was mostly getting at.
This i can agree with, i just think it's mischaracterizing the counter-argument to call it paradoxical. It's not paradoxical, it just doesn't present a serious challenge to Plantinga's argument.
Then, I'm not sure then if there's a conflict here, then. I'm not sure if Plantinga's argument is necessarily contingent on the idea that free well have a metaphysical component (though, I think he may be implying he thinks there is) insomuch that people buy into the idea that God creating humans with the ability do defy his will was sort of a "net benefit" for everyone.
Well, without some kind of metaphysical component to free will (not necessarily the one offered by Plantinga), how exactly does it make sense to speak of the ability to defy the will of the omniscient Creator? The more mundane sense of freedom from coercion would not enable anyone to defy the will of God. Frankfurt's definition is more rigorous, but is similarly deficient in that regard.
I am interested in Crick's position, I just haven't had time to finish reading the article. <.<
What article is this?
If i understand it correctly, Francis Crick's position is simply bog-standard materialism but with a neuroscientific component. He didn't originate it, either, although he was afaik the first to formulate it in terms of an Alice in Wonderland reference, which is nice.
I wouldn't think the two examples are that comparable. I mean, scientific evidence showing that the world is a certain age vs the argument that it's an elaborate ruse by God or Satan isn't exactly the same as scientific evidence showing our brains react certain ways to certain situations and suggesting that there might be something else influencing our brain then the sum total of events that have built the biological mass in our heads.
What of the findings that electrically shocking specific parts of the brain can produce specific and replicable effects?
I guess the difference here is I don't really find it impossible, and the specific example wasn't really here nor there. But, I've understood "love" or "benevolence" in this case to include letting someone grow or develop on their own. Which probably gets a bit more complicated then say even the human forms of love and benevolence from rulers when one has to deal with the entire human race and possibly much more.
But we're probably just operating of rather different definitions here.
I mean, you could probably make the argument that there are concepts of evil that are pretty universally agreed to be "bad", but then you just sort of obscured the appeal to emotion with an argument ad populum.
Then would it be accurate to say that those articulating the so-called 'problem of evil' are assuming access to a concrete definition of evil that they simply don't have?
Can animals commit evil acts? Say, a bear loves the taste of human flesh, and hunts down and kills humans. Or there is a serial rapist that reincarnates as a boar, who loves to rape female hikers in the north western mountains. Or say that an alligator decides to murder a child not because it's hungry, scared, or territorial, but because the child was of an ethnic minority background or had a different color of skin than it's regular human visitors?
Can animals commit evil acts? Say, a bear loves the taste of human flesh, and hunts down and kills humans. Or there is a serial rapist that reincarnates as a boar, who loves to rape female hikers in the north western mountains. Or say that an alligator decides to murder a child not because it's hungry, scared, or territorial, but because the child was of an ethnic minority background or had a different color of skin than it's regular human visitors?
No, because non-sapient animals can only have causes for their actions, not reasons, and thus, cannot be ethical agents. This is also the reason it is okay to eat meat.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Well, without some kind of metaphysical component to free will (not necessarily the one offered by Plantinga), how exactly does it make sense to speak of the ability to defy the will of the omniscient Creator? The more mundane sense of freedom from coercion would not enable anyone to defy the will of God. Frankfurt's definition is more rigorous, but is similarly deficient in that regard.
I think this is where we start drifting into counter arguments against the Argument from free will. The suggestion that "God knows everything that ever happened, and that is happening, but cannot know the future, because it doesn't exist. Because it is not possible to know something that doesn't exist, not knowing the future does not affect God's omniscience. In the same way, because it is not possible to make triangles with four angles, not being able to make triangles with four angles does not affect God's omnipotence." might work in this case given that our actions wouldn't at least be known to God. I'll grant that this is definitely operating under a different definition of "omniscient" then we tend to accept in this case though.
What article is this? If i understand it correctly, Francis Crick's position is simply bog-standard materialism but with a neuroscientific component. He didn't originate it, either, although he was afaik the first to formulate it in terms of an Alice in Wonderland reference, which is nice.
Never mind, I thought you were talking about the article Odradek linked.
What of the findings that electrically shocking specific parts of the brain can produce specific and replicable effects?
I don't really see how that's much different than knowing how people will react if we give them certain chemicals or substances. I'm guessing there's maybe a degree to which we can predict what will happen with these shocks more than my example, but still, it's not like it was unknown you could coerce certain behaviors out of someone using various methods. I certainly don't think metaphysical libertarianist have any issue with the notion that the brain works on certain physical properties.
Then would it be accurate to say that those articulating the so-called 'problem of evil' are assuming access to a concrete definition of evil that they simply don't have?
No. They usually strait up use the most heinous examples they can find of horrible things happening to children or baby animals being immolated in forest fires. They're not attempting to side-step logical fallacies as far as I can tell. They usually seem to come up with the worse example on hand and either hope no one calls them on it or don't think of the implications of hinging their argument on their audiences emotional response.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
I should probably mention that the "problem of evil" usually defines "evil" as "anything bad". It's not usually limited to the willfully malicious for the purpose of the argument.
So they are using a slightly different definition then what people usually think of as "evil".
Not that I think necessarily adds any logical credence to the argument...
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Or not that I wan't to rain on any one's conversation of what "Evil" is, just that a8 and I are probably focusing on a broader definition for our discussion.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
I think that would only work if we where talking about the "Problem of Good" in a world supposedly ruled by an Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnimalevolent deity.
It's still really fun to talk about, although I have literally exausted every single thing that comes to my mind that wasn't already brought up by your ARGUMENT HOGGING PARAGRAPHS. There's argumentless kids in Africa you evil prick, save some for the rest of us.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
I STOLE ALL THEIR ARGUMENTS SO THAT WE CAN REFLECT POSITIVELY ON THE TIMES WHEN SOME DOUCHE NOZZLE DOESN'T HOG ALL OUR ARGUMENTS AND BE THANKFUL FOR THE ARGUMENTS WE HAVE.
I think this is where we start drifting into counter arguments against the Argument from free will. The suggestion that "God knows everything that ever happened, and that is happening, but cannot know the future, because it doesn't exist. Because it is not possible to know something that doesn't exist, not knowing the future does not affect God's omniscience. In the same way, because it is not possible to make triangles with four angles, not being able to make triangles with four angles does not affect God's omnipotence." might work in this case given that our actions wouldn't at least be known to God.
In case i wasn't clear, i'm not actually arguing that free will and an omniscient God are incompatible.
But in a causally-determined universe in which human beings are not metaphysically free, speaking hypothetically, does it not follow that their actions must also be causally determined? The God of such a universe doesn't need to observe the future, since He can observe the universe in its present state and use that information to predict everything that is going to happen.
Without possessing at least some form of metaphysical freedom (be it Plantinga's, Schelling's or otherwise) i do not see how it is possible for a human being in a universe created by God to defy God's will.
I don't really see how that's much different than knowing how people will react if we give them certain chemicals or substances. I'm guessing there's maybe a degree to which we can predict what will happen with these shocks more than my example, but still, it's not like it was unknown you could coerce certain behaviors out of someone using various methods. I certainly don't think metaphysical libertarianist have any issue with the notion that the brain works on certain physical properties.
Fair enough. It seems to me that Cartesian dualism is impossible to disprove, though, because no matter how much we learn about the brain's function, its proponents can always claim the existence of an unobservable, immaterial component. It doesn't seem to have much in the way of practical implications.
No. They usually strait up use the most heinous examples they can find of horrible things happening to children or baby animals being immolated in forest fires. They're not attempting to side-step logical fallacies as far as I can tell. They usually seem to come up with the worse example on hand and either hope no one calls them on it or don't think of the implications of hinging their argument on their audiences emotional response.
i see. In that case, they're simply being disingenuous. i would be wary of assuming that nobody who makes the argument has honest intentions, though.
I should probably mention that the "problem of evil" usually defines "evil" as "anything bad". It's not usually limited to the willfully malicious for the purpose of the argument.
So they are using a slightly different definition then what people usually think of as "evil".
Not that I think necessarily adds any logical credence to the argument...
According to the article Odradek linked, Schelling distinguished between the meaningless, directionless 'general evil' of nature and the 'particular evil' of humankind, in which reason is directed towards evil ends.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
But in a causally-determined universe in which human beings are not metaphysically free, speaking hypothetically, does it not follow that their actions must also be causally determined? The God of such a universe doesn't need to observe the future, since He can observe the universe in its present state and use that information to predict everything that is going to happen.
I considered that, but I think it's a bit paradoxical to suggest. "God doesn't see the future, but he can predict everything that happens anyways" is basically the same as saying God can see the future. I'd imagine in this case we'd be looking at a much more limited form of omniscience then is usually discussed with God. Basically one where he could see everything currently happening, but not the future.
This made me look around a little bit and this may not necessarily be contrary to canon. I'm not sure it's even implied that God sees the future, it I'm kind of wondering what the ancient Hebrews thought considering God seems to change his mind occasionally in the Bible.
Fair enough. It seems to me that Cartesian dualism is impossible to disprove, though, because no matter how much we learn about the brain's function, its proponents can always claim the existence of an unobservable, immaterial component. It doesn't seem to have much in the way of practical implications.
You're taking a rather naturalistic viewpoint here, don't you think? And I don't think science discovering the inner workings of the brain is equivalent, logically or otherwise, to establishing some sort of proof that humans are basically just the sum of their genes and whatever events have affected them up to that point.
Concepts of metaphysical dualism and impossible to disprove ideas aside, it just strikes me as the sort of presumption that tends to hinder scientific progress down the line.
i see. In that case, they're simply being disingenuous. i would be wary of assuming that nobody who makes the argument has honest intentions, though.
Well some have used it to reconcile their own view of God with their own belief that evil is a real thing. Usually this ends in elaboration or reinterpretation of the terminology used or a suggested solution. They don't need to really elaborate on the concept of evil or try to establish proof here because they've already accepted the premise so they can address it.
Others are clearly out to disprove God entirely. Which is usually where there's an attempt to turn it into a full blown proof. This is rarely pretty by the end of it because, as mentioned, these basically pull out all the steps as far as "Evil" is concerned and dredges up the worse case scenario to discuss and also has to rely on very rigidly defined terms.
According to the article Odradek linked, Schelling distinguished between the meaningless, directionless 'general evil' of nature and the 'particular evil' of humankind, in which reason is directed towards evil ends.
Interesting, I'm used to seeing the idea presented in a very broad sense.
Though, distinguishing between the two would be useful, as the "Free Will Defense" only covers "'particular evil' of humankind"...unless one blames everything else on demons...
Odradek said: Viani said:Can animals commit evil acts? Say, a bear loves the taste of human flesh, and hunts down and kills humans. Or there is a serial rapist that reincarnates as a boar, who loves to rape female hikers in the north western mountains. Or say that an alligator decides to murder a child not because it's hungry, scared, or territorial, but because the child was of an ethnic minority background or had a different color of skin than it's regular human visitors?
No, because non-sapient animals can only have causes for their actions, not reasons, and thus, cannot be ethical agents. This is also the reason it is okay to eat meat.
But therein lies a massive, gaping issue: How do we recognise and define sapience?
Yes, but because of what hurting animals does to us, rather than what hurting animals does to them.
Explain this to me, because I really don't understand it at all.
Maybe it's just the fact that I really like animals and feel that humans tend to think a bit much of themselves, but that argument really sounds like the same kind of bullshit justification that backed up the old Catholic "animals don't have souls" dogma. And if you're going down that road... well, let's just say that I will become very, very, very angry, equally quickly.
I was just kind of experimenting with Kantianism because it had quick easy answers to Viani's questions. Personally, I think animals getting hurt is bad even if no humans are involved.
I understand, and I apologise for my nippiness. That particular subject makes me irrationally, violently angry, and I am sorry that you had to see even a shade of that simply for making a philosophical proposition.
Kantian ethics are highly unsatisfactory to me. While I kind of like the whole "if you believe it, do it" attitude toward morality that Kant put forward, the way that he treats everything else is just sort of backwards to my own logic and emotions.
Kant is one of the few philosophers who doesn't seem to have a legion of sociopathic manchildren as a segment of his adherents, so surely that at least is a point in his favor?
"Here the question is: should moral respect go with sapience or with biology? Sentience-utilitarians such as Singer say the latter because they see morality as normatively driven by the intrinsic sensuous evaluation implicit in the phenomena of pain and pleasure. But we kantians see the normative basis of morality as derived form the positive freedom of giving and asking for reasons. Mammalian sensuousness, sentience, is at best a necessary condition of that, not a sufficient one. According to this line of thought, it is the capacity to engage in conceptual activity, being a subject of sapience, not of sentience, that is in the first instance morally significant. This does not, of course, settle it that we should not accord respect and rights to embryos, as potential moral persons, or for that matter, to non-human animals. But in each case the argument appeals to an indirect connection to the primary subjects of moral respect and (so) rights: discursive creatures. Kant certainly thought it was wrong to cause pain to animals for no reason–but that is not in the first instance because of what it does to them, but because of what doing that to them does to us. "
So I suppose a kantian would say that any animal that has anywhere near the ability to master the kind of conceptual/linguistic framework humans use to give and ask for reasons would count as an ethical agent.
The interesting thing here is that utilitarianism gives us grounds to treat other sentient animals as ethical agents, but leaves us at a loss as to what to do if we meet or create an alien race or AI whose biology and motivational systems work differently than ours do, while kantianism does the opposite.
On the one hand, Kant's views are not particularly exploitable to destructive ends, at least compared with more overtly radical ideologues, nor are most of his basic assertions illegitimate by any means: The mind and the senses do effect how we interpret reality, and resting morality purely on intangibles or religious dogma is misguided.
On the other, there is a certain... robotic quality, I guess, to a lot of Kant's thinking, and a degree of "logical" absolutism that worries me. It's not quite in Ayn Rand territory, but it strikes me as cold and rigid, and perhaps impractical as well.
^ Like that. There's something creepy to me about that particular form of denial of the organic. The Gnostic rejection of the hyle, I get, but that whole train of thought makes me uncomfortable for some reason.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Maybe it's just the fact that I really like animals and feel that humans tend to think a bit much of themselves, but that argument really sounds like the same kind of bullshit justification that backed up the old Catholic "animals don't have souls" dogma. And if you're going down that road... well, let's just say that I will become very, very, very angry, equally quickly.
Animals not having an immortal soul is Biblical canon.
That being said the Bible has a number of verses that seem to point towards humans being in charge of not fucking up the planet, so there's not really anything in the Bible that allows for the mistreatment of animals.
You're taking a rather naturalistic viewpoint here, don't you think?
i guess so.
i don't really see how science can be expected to account for things that can't be tested for, though. Anything like that is outside the scope of scientific inquiry.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i guess so.
i don't really see how science can be expected to account for things that can't be tested for, though. Anything like that is outside the scope of scientific inquiry.
Well I'm not expecting science to be looking for a soul, per se. But I still don't think being able to show brain functions are rooted to certain areas, chemicals, etc... is tantamount to establishing humans are really complex robots. And I'm not sure scientist are really looking at it from this angle either.
Isn't it because animals didn't want/need one because they didn't ascend into sentience?
Biblical speaking, God only gave sapience to humans and basically gave humans domain over the earth and animals (as stewards/care takes, not necessarily to rule as we see fit).
Man is a most complex simple creature: see what he weaves, and how base his reasons for doing so.
Personally, I go in for a more deistic approach; the Divine Clockmaker created the universe, setting it in motion, and gave us a variety of different codes, but chooses not to do anything further because it wishes to see what we're going to do with it.
Yes, I am not including omniscience as a trait of the divine.
So by that reasoning, evil is a human creation, and that everything is our fault.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Well, we still have disease and natural disasters to account for.
But you're obviously floating a suggestion which isn't concerned with the whole "omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscience" package anyway, so you have a greater range of options to chose from there.
Comments
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
It does pose the paradox of atheists imposing the imaginary concepts of justice and kindness on themselves, though.
As to God not being both all-powerful and the Good if he doesn't intervene to prevent evil wills from having painful effects on others, that sounds like the Orthodox interpretation of Hell, where God welcomes everyone into his presence and the wicked experience his goodness as burning and inability to affect others. I can see a utilitarian argument that letting depraved beings hurt each other and hope they come to their senses does more good than quarantining them from other beings.
With that said, i'm also not sure how relevant any of this is when Plantinga presented his argument as simply articulating a possible case, and doing so within a libertarian framework. Compatibilist disagreement is to be expected, but doesn't affect his argument any. >_<
Before i proceed i think i should clarify that i simply listed and outlined the parts of Plantinga's argument that i find difficult to believe, as i was asked to. i am not attempting formally to disprove them outright, which is certainly beyond me, if it can be done at all. i don't see that the identification of the human being with an incorporeal soul or dualistic being solves my problem, which is that, the way i see it, human actions have a clear cause (in terms of their motivations, not the physical brain matter) and therefore cannot be identified with Plantinga's free moral agents. Crick's position appears to support my view, but my view is not contingent on it. Well, bearing in mind that i'm not myself a psychologist, psychologists are the foremost experts on the human mind, having studied it in considerable detail. The association of thought with electrochemical activity in the brain and the linking of specific mental processes with specific parts of the brain are both supported by an enormous amount of scientific research. As a layperson from a scientific standpoint, am i wrong to accept these claims?
i think my position here is comparable to how i would address Young Earth Creationist arguments, incidentally. i don't believe the YEC position has been logically disproven, but the observed evidence is overwhelmingly against it. No, it doesn't, and as you say, the free will defence demonstrates that such actions are not necessarily caused by God, and i wasn't suggesting that they were.
The Holocaust was just an example; you could substitute Stalin's purges, Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward, the French Reign of Terror, or anything unambiguously meeting an objective definition of evil. All i'm saying is that there are some evils so foul that i find it impossible to understand God's allowing them to take place. There's clearly no reason why i must understand God's every action and inaction and i'm not presumptuous enough to expect to do so, but i find this particular detail disturbing and difficult to reconcile with my understanding of love. Well, you're much better versed in this stuff than i am. Is it possible to discuss the concepts of good and evil without introducting an appeal to emotion, by this reasoning?
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
If i understand it correctly, Francis Crick's position is simply bog-standard materialism but with a neuroscientific component. He didn't originate it, either, although he was afaik the first to formulate it in terms of an Alice in Wonderland reference, which is nice. What of the findings that electrically shocking specific parts of the brain can produce specific and replicable effects? Very possibly. Then would it be accurate to say that those articulating the so-called 'problem of evil' are assuming access to a concrete definition of evil that they simply don't have?
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
I'll grant that this is definitely operating under a different definition of "omniscient" then we tend to accept in this case though.
Never mind, I thought you were talking about the article Odradek linked.
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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So then, does animal abuse count as evil? The torture, rape or murder of non-sentient animals and plants is in a different category than humans.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
But in a causally-determined universe in which human beings are not metaphysically free, speaking hypothetically, does it not follow that their actions must also be causally determined? The God of such a universe doesn't need to observe the future, since He can observe the universe in its present state and use that information to predict everything that is going to happen.
Without possessing at least some form of metaphysical freedom (be it Plantinga's, Schelling's or otherwise) i do not see how it is possible for a human being in a universe created by God to defy God's will. Ah, right.
i think you'll like that one. i found it fascinating. Fair enough. It seems to me that Cartesian dualism is impossible to disprove, though, because no matter how much we learn about the brain's function, its proponents can always claim the existence of an unobservable, immaterial component. It doesn't seem to have much in the way of practical implications. i see. In that case, they're simply being disingenuous. i would be wary of assuming that nobody who makes the argument has honest intentions, though. According to the article Odradek linked, Schelling distinguished between the meaningless, directionless 'general evil' of nature and the 'particular evil' of humankind, in which reason is directed towards evil ends.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
No, because non-sapient animals can only have causes for their actions, not reasons, and thus, cannot be ethical agents. This is also the reason it is okay to eat meat.
But therein lies a massive, gaping issue: How do we recognise and define sapience?
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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i don't really see how science can be expected to account for things that can't be tested for, though. Anything like that is outside the scope of scientific inquiry.
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
Well I'm not expecting science to be looking for a soul, per se. But I still don't think being able to show brain functions are rooted to certain areas, chemicals, etc... is tantamount to establishing humans are really complex robots. And I'm not sure scientist are really looking at it from this angle either. Biblical speaking, God only gave sapience to humans and basically gave humans domain over the earth and animals (as stewards/care takes, not necessarily to rule as we see fit).
Yes, I am not including omniscience as a trait of the divine.
So by that reasoning, evil is a human creation, and that everything is our fault.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
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B̤̺͍̰͕̺̠̕u҉̖͙̝̮͕̲ͅm̟̼̦̠̹̙p͡s̹͖ ̻T́h̗̫͈̙̩r̮e̴̩̺̖̠̭̜ͅa̛̪̟͍̣͎͖̺d͉̦͠s͕̞͚̲͍ ̲̬̹̤Y̻̤̱o̭͠u̥͉̥̜͡ ̴̥̪D̳̲̳̤o̴͙̘͓̤̟̗͇n̰̗̞̼̳͙͖͢'҉͖t̳͓̣͍̗̰ ͉W̝̳͓̼͜a̗͉̳͖̘̮n͕ͅt͚̟͚ ̸̺T̜̖̖̺͎̱ͅo̭̪̰̼̥̜ ̼͍̟̝R̝̹̮̭ͅͅe̡̗͇a͍̘̤͉͘d̼̜ 
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