philosophy
is particularly systematic in that all the impulsions are taken in by it according to a
line of power that is invariable precisely because it fully assumes its status of singularity.
This is why, in my view, it can also be described - at least if the adjective is
given a precise meaning- as an abstract philosophy. By "abstraction," one is not to
understand that it moves in what it absolutely repudiates: namely, the generality
subsuming concrete cases. Let us simply state that the appropriate measure here is
the quasi-organic consistency of conceptual connections, and the constant putting
into movement of this consistency by the greatest possible number of cases. Care
must be taken not to forget that what is submitted to this trial by the adventitious
multiple of cases never stops experiencing itself as self-identical. For it is the fact
that a concept, traversing the illimited determination of cases, reunites with itself
and that it supplely resists the variation of that which calls upon it to return, that
constitutes the only possible protocol of validation for this concept.
That is to say, only with the cancellation/negation of this vortex of Tneb through the gesture of the EntScheidungis a genuine beginning possible, an initiation of a (temporal) movement of change and flux (instead of cyclical repetition) flowing away from its thereafter-surpassed past point of origin.12 As with Lacan's Real cause as tuche or Derrida's description of the founding of the law and its apparatuses,13 Schelling's act of breaking away from the Real of ground cannot itself be included within the parameters of the reality of existence that it generates as an outcome (here, one encounters the logic according to which a certain type of cause is necessarily obfuscated by its effects—the domain of the cause's effects is structurally unable to accommodate or integrate its own "lost cause"). Time begins with the Ent-Scheidung But this decision-separation cannot be included within or contained by the temporal frame that it erects.
Consequently, since everything is counted, but since the one of the
count, being merely a result, implies as its ghostly remainder the
fact that multiplicity does not originally have the form of the one, it
is necessary to acknowledge that, from within a situation, pure or
inconsistent multiplicity is at once excluded from the whole, and
hence excluded from presentation as such, but also included as what
presentation itself or in itself ‘would be’, were that which the law
forbids as inconceivable to be conceivable: that the one is not, and
that the being of consistency is inconsistency.
This is why I find this move unconvincing, the claim that you can just keep on intensifying and intensifying. The second problem arises here: a kind of imperative to affirm re-emerges, because the claim is that, in mapping the process of movements of deterritorialization and partial reterritorialization, you’re mapping activity itself, because it’s nested upon the strata, it occupies an immanent position vis-a-vis these material processes; you no longer have the transcendent exteriority between theory and world. Theory itself is implicated in the reality it’s describing. Then things become unclear.There is a substitution, of a sublimated materialist eschatology, for all forms of rationalist teleology. Why keep intensifying? Because there is always a surplus of stratification. One wouldn’t need to deterritorialize and destratify unless there was always a complement of reterritorialization and restratification. You only need to deterritorialize because there are strata. Why is there stratification in the first place?Because there is an organising dualism. The claim is that, although the real itself is absolutely deterritorialized, the degree zero of absolute intensity, it’s always differentiated and stratified, sedimented in various complex ways. Once thinking itself becomes subordinated to the imperative to intensify and destratify, it’s clear that there must be a limitrophic point of absolute deterritorialization towards which the process of affirmation or acceleration tends
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i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
In defense of the source material, some of these were unusually difficult passages in a mostly readable work, or otherwise make sense in context. But still
I didn't find the philosophy I did at A-level that hard, but it wasn't really very technical.
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis
i get so angry sometimes i just punch plankton --Klinotaxis